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LEARNED TREATISES AS DIRECT EVIDENCE: THE
ALABAMA EXPERIENCE*
A majority of American jurisdictions refuse to permit the use of
learned treatises as direct evidence, reasoning that to -do so would
violate the rule against hearsay evidence. However, many com-
mentators have contended that, in adopting such a position, these
courts have failed to consider the underlying purposes of the hear-
say rule. Alabama, which has permitted the introduction of trea-
tises as direct evidence, affords a useful contrast for testing both
the rationale of the majority rule and the criticisms of it. It has
been the goal of this comment to evaluate the present majority
view against the Alabama experience. On the basis of the responses
of Alabama attorneys, the conclusion is that the admission of
learned treatises as direct evidence would be -a desirable modifica-
cation of the present rules of evidence.
I N NEARLY all American jurisdictions the hearsay rule denies ad-
mission of learned treatises in evidence as proof of the truth of state-
ments contained therein.' This near unanimity has not gone un-
challenged, however, as the rule has been disparaged by virtually all
commentators who have treated the subject,2 and both the Model
0 The DuKE LAw JOURNAL would like to express its appreciation to the officers of
the Alabama State Bar Association for the invaluable assistance which they rendered
during the early stages of this project.
E.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Yates, 79 F. 584 (8th Cir. 1897); Gallagher v. Market Street
Ry., 67 Cal. 13, 6 P. 869 (1885); Ruth v. Fenchel, 37 N.J. Super. 295, 117 A.2d 284
(1955), aff'd, 21 N.J. 171, 121 A.2d 373 (1956); Hallworth v. Republic Steel Corp., 153
Ohio St. 349, 91 N.E.2d 690 (1950); Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation N. Hosps., 226 Ore.
616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
Wigmore suggests that the phrase "learned treatises" is a more accurate representa-
tion of the scope of the rule than "books of science and art" or "scientific books."
Nevertheless, the controversy is pretty well limited to books on the "inexact" sciences,
predominantly medicine. See 6 J. WIGMoRE, Ev DENCE § 1690 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as W5GMORE]. The exception has long been established in most jurisdictions as
to the so-called "exact" sciences, such as mathematics. Under this exception annuity
tables, mortality tables, almanacs, etc. have been admitted, despite their hearsay char-
acter. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Buffalo Housewrecking & Salvage Co., 40 F. Supp.
378 (W.D.N.Y. 1941); Butler v. Borowsky, 120 So. 2d 656 (Fla. App. 1960); Mitchell
v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., 117 Utah 224, 214 P.2d 620 (1950); see Note, 2
BAYLOR L. Rxv. 104 (1949). The theory supporting the admissibility of such publica-
tions in evidence is that they are based on unchanging data, whereas medical and other
learned treatises are not.
2 See, e.g., 6 WIGM IOa § 1690; Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 316 (1967); Note, 29 U. CIN. L.
Rxv. 255 (1960); 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 252 (1954).
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Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence provide ex-
pressly that learned treatises are properly admissible.3 Furthermore,
the decisional law of Alabama has constituted a long-standing excep-
tion to the majority rule.4 Evaluation of the present rule has largely
been in terms of abstract argument, with both proponents and critics
predicting that its alteration would have various consequences on
the actual conduct of trials.5 Without denying the value and neces-
sity of scrutinizing the rule and proposed changes against the demands
of a rational trial process, it would seem that any conclusive verdict
must be built on the results of empirical studies as well. As one
writer correctly observed, "The final consideration is: Will the pro-
posed [learned treatises exception] ... work? For the answer we must
look to the state of Alabama where such evidence has been received
... over a long period of years."" In response to this need, the pri-
mary design of this comment will be to evaluate the learned treatises
exception in light of its actual implementation in Alabama practice.
To obtain the necessary data a questionnaire was sent to nearly all
trial attorneys in that state,7 and their responses form the basis for
the principal observations and conclusions made herein. Emphasis
8 Uniform Rule of Evidence 63 (31), adapted from the Model Code of Evidence § 529
(1942): "Learned Treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a sub.
ject of history, science or art [is admissible] to prove the truth of a matter stated therein
if the judge takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a reliable authority in the subject."
4 Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857), is the first reported case in which
the exception was recognized in Alabama. See the discussion of the Alabama position
in text accompanying notes 8-22 infra.
For example, those opposed to the reception of medical treatises as evidence have
charged, among other things, that such materials are characterized by instability, would
only confuse the jury, and are unreliable because they lack the sanction of an oath. See
6 WIGMOaE § 1690. Proponents, on the other hand, have argued that the adversary
system would remedy any such defects and that significant cost savings would result
from the availability of medical books for use as evidence. Id. § 1691.
6 Dana, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin, Admission of Learned Treatises in Evi-
dence, 1945 WIs. L. Rav. 455, 461.
Questionnaires were mailed to approximately ninety-one percent of Alabama's
attorneys in an effort to canvass thoroughly the state's trial bar (no list of the latter
being available). One hundred and eighteen questionnaires were returned. See note
84 infra. Of this number, twenty-seven were disallowed because the questionee indi-
cated he lacked any experience in utilizing the learned treatises exception, and five
blank questionnaries were discarded, leaving eighty-six "qualified questionnaries." In
computing the total responses on a particular question, any questionnaire whose answer
was internally inconsistent was not counted. The writers of this comment recognize
that the derivation of viable generalizations from surveys of this kind is a very delicate
task and that the conclusions reached must be accepted cautiously, if for no other
reason than that the reliability of aggregate answers might be distorted by some un-
known variable. See Appendix for reprint of the questionnaire.
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throughout is on the use of medical books, since they are the treatises
most often encountered in the cases and, presumably, in day-to-day
courtroom experience.
CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
The Alabama position
The minority Alabama rule dates from the early case of Stouden-
meier v. Williamson,8 where the state supreme court, in reviewing a
civil action, upheld the admission in evidence of a medical treatise on
venereal disease. Although aware of the dearth of authority on the
issue, the court permitted the jury to consider such evidence since
the admissible opinions of physicians as to medical matters were
themselves founded substantially on the published writings of other
medical experts. To accord the former evidentiary respectability
while denying the same status to the latter would be to impose an un-
justifiable limitation, depriving the jury of a valued source of knowl-
edge.9 As a precondition to admission, the court posited the require-
ment that the party seeking to introduce medical books authenticate
them as "standard works with that profession." In addition, the
court stated that any technical or confusing portions would have to
be clarified for the jury.10
Sixty-six years after the Williamson decision, the Alabama legis-
lature enacted a statute declaring that "books of science or art" were,
"when made by persons indifferent between the parties .... prima
facie evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest."" This
provision has been interpreted by the state supreme court as statutory
approval,12 though not a comprehensive statement,1s of the William-
son hearsay exception. However, the operative details of this judi-
'29 Ala. 558 (1857).
9 Id. at 567. The court, in addition, analogized the admission of medical treatises
to aid the jury in resolving factual disputes to the long-sanctioned reliance by the judge
on standard legal commentaries to settle questions of law. Id. at 568.
20 Id. at 567.
"1 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 413 (1960).
22 City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939).
18 Statutes identical to the Alabama provision are on the books in seven other
states. See note 29 infra. Alabama is the only jurisdiction, however, which has
construed this provision to authorize the introduction of medical texts as independent
evidence. The soundness of this interpretation is questionable since the provision is,
on its face, limited to "facts of general notoriety and interest," while the compass
of facts provable by treatise evidence under the Williamson rule is much broader,
encompassing technical and obscure matter. See 6 WIGMORE § 1693; note 30 infra.
cially-created rule of evidence have been developed by case law.
Moreover, although the focus in Williamson was confined to medical
books, the compass of the rule has been extended more broadly to
include other scientific treatises, 14 such as a national safety code
handbook reporting findings regarding the "science of electricity.""'
The use of scientific periodicals under the rule has not received
explicit sanction by Alabama's appellate courts, even though it would
appear that such materials would be admissible if properly authenti-
cated.' The fact that an author has merely reported the findings of
others will not sustain a hearsay objection, since the author's demon-
strated standing as an authority permits the use of his own statements
and those of others which he has chosen to adopt and incorporate
as his own.' 7  In addition to the authentication requirement, 8 the
1" Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n v. Mullins, 260 Ala. 173, 69 So. 2d 261 (1953) (Public
Health Service Bulletin dealing with carbon monoxide admitted); City of Dothan v.
Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939) (U.S. Bureau of Standards handbook on elec-
trical wiring); Merkle v. State, 37 Ala. 139 (1861) (textbook concerning fermented
liquors).
2City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); cf. Cook v. State, 110
Ala. 40, 20 So. 360 (1895); Dantzler v. De Bardeleben & Iron Co., 101 Ala. 309, 14 So.
10 (1893). In Adler v. State, 55 Ala. 16 (1876), reference to standard dictionaries was
approved as an aid to statutory interpretation. Other jurisdictions have similarly
permitted evidentiary use of dictionary definitions though eschewing the learned treatise
rule. See 6 WIGMORE § 1699. Such a practice clearly involves acceptance of out-of-
court "testimony" or hearsay.
When the mental competency or sanity of a party is in issue, the Alabama courts
have admitted in evidence materials from the field of psychiatry, which, though con-
sidered a branch of medicine, is less stable than other branches of medical science.
See Batson v. Batson, 217 Ala. 450, 117 So. 10 (1928); Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 36,
95 So. 171 (1922); Russell v. State, 201 Ala. 572, 78 So. 916 (1918); Bale v. States, 63
Ala. 30 (1879).
16 An article from the Southern Medical Association Journal was held correctly ex-
cluded from evidence on the ground of insufficient authentication: "there was no
imprimatur of an [expert] . .. to the effect that the writing was of a substantially
recognized theory such as might be found in a standard medical book." Wiggins v.
State, 39 Ala. App. 433, 440, 104 So. 2d 560, 566 (1958). Two years earlier, the Fifth
Circuit held that the exclusion of an article from the Journal of the American Medical
Association by the federal trial judge sitting in the Northern District of Alabama
was not prejudicial error in view of the testimony as a whole, commenting that this
precise issue had not yet been determined by Alabama courts. Uhl v. Echols Transfer
Co., 238 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1956). Despite these adverse holdings, responses to the
questionnaires establish that medical journals have been and are being admitted
by the state's trial judges.
11 Blakeney v. Alabama Power Co., 222 Ala. 394, 133 So. 16 (1931).
18 See Wiggins v. State, 39 Ala. App. 433, 104 So. 2d 560, cert. denied, 267 Ala. 701,
104 So. 2d 567 (1958); Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. App. 306, 197 So. 55, cert. denied,
240 Ala. 57, 197 So. 58 (1940); cf. Smarr v. State, 260 Ala. 30, 68 So. 2d 6 (1953). More-
over, the author must be shown to be an expert as to the narrow topic dealt with in the
excerpt introduced. Timothy v. State, 130 Ala. 68, 30 So. 339 (1900).
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ordinary bounds of relevancy imposed on all types of evidence must
be respected by the party proffering textual materials. 19 Finally,
case precedent establishes that learned treatise evidence may be
offered in either criminal" or civil actions,21 the latter including
medical malpractice suits.22
Other departures from the general rule
Wisconsin recently joined Alabama's minority position by judi-
cially adopting for prospective application a rule permitting the
admission of authoritative learned treatises.23  An official court rule
in a third state, New Jersey, allows an expert witness to read passages
from learned treatises after prior notice has been given.24 Moreover,
while other courts have been uniformly hostile to the evidentiary use
of learned treatises,2 5 inroads on the general rule have been made by
legislative enactments in several states. Thus in Massachusetts26 and
29 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 266 Ala. 521, 97 So. 2d 879 (1957); Watkins
v. Potts, 219 Ala. 427, 122 So. 416 (1929); Bradley v. Williams, 20 Ala. App. 308, 101 So.
808 (1924); cf. Gorman-Gammil Drug Co. v. Watkins, 185 Ala. 653, 64 So. 350 (1914).
A general objection of irrelevancy will not suffice where parts of a book offered in
evidence are relevant and parts are not. Bradley v. Williams, supra.
20 Lambert v. State, 234 Ala. 155, 174 So. 298 (1937); Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 36,
95 So. 171 (1922); Russell v. State, 201 Ala. 572, 78 So. 916 (1918); Oakley v. State, 135
Ala. 29, 33 So. 693 (1902); Timothy v. State, 130 Ala. 68, 30 So. 339 (1900); Bales v.
State, 63 Ala. 30 (1879); Merkle v. State, 37 Ala. 139 (1861); Wiggins v. State, 39 Ala. App.
433, 104 So. 2d 560, cert. denied, 267 Ala. 701, 104 So. 2d 567 (1958); Franklin v. State,
29 Ala. App. 306, 197 So. 55, cert. denied, 240 Ala. 57, 197 So. 58 (1940); cf. Smarr v.
State, 260 Ala. 30, 68 So. 2d 6 (1953).
2"Uhl v. Echols Transfer Co., 238 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1956); Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. Nichols, 266 Ala. 521, 97 So. 2d 879 (1957); Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n v.
Mullins, 260 Ala. 173, 69 So. 2d 261 (1953); City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188
So. 264 (1939); Blakeney v. Alabama Power Co., 222 Ala. 394, 133 So. 16 (1931); Watkins
v. Potts, 219 Ala. 427, 122 So. 416 (1929); Batson v. Batson, 217 Ala. 450, 117 So. 10
(1928); Gorman-Gammil Drug Co. v. Watkins, 185 Ala. 653, 64 So. 350 (1914); Birming-
ham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Moor, 148 Ala. 115, 42 So. 1024 (1906); Stoudenmeier v.
Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857); Bradley v. Williams, 20 Ala. App. 308, 101 So. 808
(1924).
22 Carraway v. Graham, 218 Ala. 453, 118 So. 807 (1928); Barfield v. South Highlands
Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915).
28 Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mutual Life Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d
505 (1966). More precisely the court appears to have adopted Rule 63 (31) of the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence. Id. at 76, 146 N.W.2d at 509.
2 4 NJ. RuLzs oF EvxnaucE 63 (31), codified with NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-32 (Supp.
1966). See also note 58 infra and accompanying text.
21 See note I supra.
28 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 79C (Supp. 1966): "Statements of fact or opinion on a
subject of science or art, contained in a published treatise, periodical, book or
pamphlet shall, insofar as the court shall find that the said statements are relevant
and that the writer of the said statements is recognized in his profession or calling as
an expert of the subject, be admissible in actions of contract or tort for malpractice,
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Nevada,27 books and treatises written by acknowledged experts are
admissible in medical malpractice actions as opinion evidence or to
prove statements contained therein. South Carolina has long had a
statute making medical or scientific works competent evidence in all
cases involving a question of sanity or poisoning, or "any article
destructive to life."28 In a number of states, books of science and art
are treated as prima facie evidence of facts of general notoriety and
interest.29 In none of these jurisdictions, however, have medical
books been held to qualify under the "general interest" statutory
standard.30 However, sundry types of written materials, such as
legal treatises, scientific and mathematical tables, dictionaries, and
works of general literature and history, are commonly received in
evidence for certain purposes in these states.31 Arguably, therefore,
error or mistake against physicians, suregons, dentists, optometrists, hospitals, and
sanitoria, as evidence tending to prove said facts or as opinion evidence; providing,
however, that the party intending to offer as evidence any such statements shall, not
less than thirty days before the trial of the action give the adverse party or his attorney
notice of such intention, stating the name of the writer of the statements, the title of
the treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet in which they are contained, the date of
publication of the same, the name of the publisher of the same, and wherever possible
or practicable the page or pages of the same on which the said statements appear."
For a case applying this statute see Thomas v. Ellis, 329 Mass. 93, 106 N.E.2d 687
(1952).
27 NEv. REv. STAT. § 51.040 (1965). The Nevada statute is nearly identical in word-
ing to its Massachusetts analogue, except that Nevada requires only three days advance
notice of title and author of the text to be offered. For a criticism of both these
statutes see Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and Reluctant Expert, 16 CATHOLIC
U.L. RFv. 158, 169 (1966).
28 S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-142 (1962).
29 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1341 (West 1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-402 (1948); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 622.23 (1946); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-1101-8 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
1218 (1964); ORE. REv. STAT. § 41.670 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-25-6 (1953). Typical
of all these statutes is that of Idaho: "Historical works, books of science or art, and
published maps or charts, when made by persons indifferent between the parties, are
prima facie evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest." Alabama has an
identical statute. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 413 (1958).
30 Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 463 (1961). Invariably under these statutes, medical books
are not deemed to contain matters of "general notoriety and interest." A classic ex-
planation is given in Gallagher v. Market St. Ry., 67 Cal. 13, 6 P. 869 (1885): "What are
'facts of general notoriety and interest?' We think the terms stand for facts of a
public nature, either at home or abroad, not existing in the memory of men as con-
tradistinguished from facts of a private nature existing within the knowledge of living
men, and as to which they may be examined as witnesses .... Such facts include the
meaning of words and allusions which may be proved by ordinary dictionaries and
authenticated books of general literary history, and facts in the exact sciences founded
upon conclusion reached from certain and constant data by processes too intricate
to be elucidated by witnesses when on examination." Id. at 15, 6 P. at 871 (emphasis
in original); see Van Skike v. Potter, 53 Neb. 28, 73 N.W. 295 (1897).
81 See 1, 3 B. JONES, EVIDENCE §§ 145, 621, 633 (5th ed. 1958); 6 WiMORE §§ 1697-99;
Note, 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 104 (1949).
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reception of such hearsay writings constitutes a partial, implied recog-
nition of the validity of the principle underlying the learned treatises
exception.32
Learned treatises in cross-examination
Although the rule as to inadmissibility is well settled when the
treatise is offered as direct, substantive evidence,33 the limits on use
of such materials on cross-examination to impeach or discredit a wit-
ness are not well defined.3 1 Under the more restrictive rule, medical
books may not be used to impeach or discredit an expert witness un-
less the witness has based his opinion in whole or in part on the
authorities. 35 On the other hand, a more liberal rule allows cross-
examination with reference to standard authorities, irrespective of
whether the witness has relied on them, in order to test the knowledge
of the alleged expert.36  Under both rules, however, reference to the
learned treatises is allowed only for purposes of impeaching or estab-
lishing the competency of a witness and not for the purpose of em-
ploying the statements as evidence. 31 While the theoretical distinc-
82 See 6 WIGM iO.E § 1696.
's Appellate courts following the majority rule have even reprimanded trial judges
for making substantive reference to medical books in their opinions. Barks v. Herzberg,
206 A.2d 507 (Del. Ch. 1965) (harmless error).
", The rule against direct admission of medical books seems also to comprehend
the situation where medical books are used in direct examination of an expert witness.
E.g., Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 139 (1875); Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis.
580, 605, 52 N.W. 778, 786 (1892): "Text-books or scientific works cannot be read in
evidence to the jury, and the rule cannot be defeated or evaded by getting their con-
tents before the jury by having a witness testify to what they contain."
15 It is generally accepted that if a witness has based his opinion at least partially on
written authorities, it is proper to cross-examine him with respect to such authorities.
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 330, 200 N.E.2d
149, 187 (1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). In some cases the cross-examination
must be limited to the exact authorities relied on by the witness. C. McCoRascK,
EVIDENC E 620, n.3 (1954). Conversely, in these jurisdictions, if the witness in no way
purports to base his testimony on authoritative publications, he cannot be cross-
examined with reference to any standard authorities in the field. Gluckstein v. Lipsett,
93 Cal. App. 2d 391, 209 P.2d 98 (1949); Mann v. Blair, 195 Ill. App. 254 (1915); State
v. Blackburn, 136 Iowa 743, 114 N.W. 531 (1908).
38 Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949) (when witness based testimony in part on
medical books, it was error to refuse cross-examination from other medical books);
Ruud v. Hendrickson, 176 Minn. 138, 222 N.W. 904 (1929) (excerpts may be read on
cross-examination from authorities in order to test knowledge and competency of
expert witness); Laird v. Boston & M.R.R., 80 N.H. 377, 117 A. 591 (1922); Kern v.
Pullen, 138 Ore. 222, 6 P.2d 224 (1931), overruled on other g'runds, 167 Ore. 439, 450,
117 P.2d 825, 829 (1941).
17Ruth v. Fenchel, 37 N.J. Super. 295, 117 A.2d 284 (1955), aff'd, 21 N.J. 171, 121'
A.2d 373 (1956). Perhaps more realistic is a dissenting view: "In both instances [direct
and cross-examination], the treatises are offered for the truth of what they contain
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tion is clear, practical applications of treatises in cross-examination
render the purported limitations meaningless. For example, an
attorney may ask a witness on cross-examination if a book is authori-
tative in the profession; upon receiving an affirmative reply, he then
reads from the book and asks the witness if he is familiar with that
passage.38 Under the guise of testing the witness' knowledge, the
desired textual material is thus presented to the jury.
THE ALABAMA EXCEPTION IN PRACTICE
Text vs. witness
For purposes of analysis, the Alabama practitioner may be said
to have, in any trial involving medical issues, an option of employing
either a live expert witness or a medical treatise to present the desired
medical facts. A number of factors bear on this initial, tactical
choice. Perhaps the most elemental is the relative intrinsic per-
suasiveness of the two kinds of evidence. Given a rough equivalence
in the respective authority of the witness and the author, it was the
opinion of almost all the attorneys questioned that the expert on the
stand enjoys a decided superiority over the treatise.39 The reasons
given varied. The mere physical presence of the witness serves to
focus the attention of the jury on the evidence being presented in a
more dramatic way than does a textual reading. The personal
appearance of the expert also permits the jurors to evaluate his
sincerity, positiveness, and seeming competence, as well as to observe
other qualitative nuances of bearing and demeanor, a potent factor
and, in both instances the question involves whether the treatises have enough trust-
worthiness to justify an exception to the hearsay rule." Note, 29 U. CIN. L. REv. 255,
262 (1960).
88 It is precisely to avoid the presentation of learned treatise evidence in this manner
that the general rule against their admission on direct examination has been adopted
in the same jurisdictions. See note 34 supra. "[T]he plaintiffs were permitted ... in the
examination in chief of medical witnesses called by themselves to read extracts ... and
then to ask the witnesses if what was so read corresponded with their own judg-
ment .. . . But it is not permissible in this manner to evade the general rule of
evidence .... Lilley v. Parkinson, 91 Cal. 655, 656, 27 P. 1091 (1891).
89 Of those Alabama attorneys who had offered learned treatises into evidence,
thirty-eight thought that a jury would accept the opinion of a live expert witness
over a conflicting text statement, one answered to the converse, and thirty-one indicated
that the jury would accept one or the other rather unpredictably. In another ques-
tion in which it was assumed that the witness and the book were of substantially
equal merit and authority, presentation of evidence via a live expert witness was deemed
intrinsically more effective "in nearly all instances" by fifty-one practitioners, "in most
instances" by twenty-two, and "in some instances" by two. No one marked the "in
few instances" alternative.
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which may increase, or occasionally detract from, the jurors' respect
for the evidence submitted. However, in a case where the bias of a
medical expert may effectively be brought out on cross-examination
by the opposing counsel, the impartiality of the text writer 40 serves
to offset the "natural" effectiveness of live testimony. Almost no
mention was made by the responding attorneys, however, of this
theoretically counterbalancing force.
Implicit in the general advantage of having the medical expert
before the court is the fact that he, in a sense, has the "last word" in
any disagreement with a text author. Thus, by "clarifying" his
position and "distinguishing" or "qualifying" that of a text writer,
the medical witness can explain away or reconcile any apparent in-
consistencies between his view and that of the treatise. Furthermore,
because of the flexibility of live testimony obtained through direct
examination, the witness gives the attorney greater latitude for em-
phasis and repetition. Moreover, a properly prepared medical expert
can, by explaining medical terminology and utilizing lay idiom, com-
municate more effectively with the average juror, who is likely to be
confused by a technical treatise excerpt. Of course, judicious selec-
tion of excerpts would alleviate this problem. However, in some
cases this solution is impeded by the unavailability of a text state-
ment relating directly to the particular medical issue at hand or the
absence of any single source adequately covering the issue, necessi-
tating resort to several texts with attendant inconvenience and con-
fusion.
As a further factor relevant to the choice of witness or treatise,
any marked difference in authoritativeness between the text writer
and the physician-witness will be crucial. The jurors' greater
familiarity with the physician or at least with his reputation, a com-
mon occurrence in small counties, was mentioned as having a de-
cisive impact. The fact that the medical witness has personally
examined the person whose health is in dispute will naturally add
,0 The fact that a medical text is written by a party independent of the lawsuit
and with no view to litigation has been advanced to demonstrate the special reliability
of this kind of evidence. See 6 WIcMORE § 1692. This intrinsic disinterestedness of a
medical author and his knowledge of the critical scrutiny which will be given to his
writing by professional colleagues arguably vitiates the objection that text writers are
not subjected to the solemnizing requirement of an oath. See Note, 52 CoaNaLL L.Q.
316 (1967). One commentator has argued that these factors make less urgent the need
for cross-examination when treatise evidence is admitted. Dana, supra note 6, at 459-60.
Contra, Note, 52 CoRN'i. L.Q. 316, 317 (1967).
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weight to his testimony. Other variations in the relative authorita-
tiveness factor may be shown: a doctor with specialized training and
experience in the area of interest opposed to a "general" medical text-
book; a written work of wide repute and unassailable merit, such as
Gray's Anatomy, opposed to a young or apparently inexperienced or
unsure doctor; a qualified physician opposed to an article published
in some lesser-known medical journal or periodical.
The result of this felt superiority of the expert witness over the
treatise for the presentation of medical evidence is that the practi-
tioner will seldom, if ever, rely solely on the latter. In most instances
it is necessary to have a doctor appear to authenticate the text sought
to be used, though other means of authentication are available.41
Therefore, because of strategic purposes and operative requirements,
introduction of text material will usually be accompanied by testi-
mony of an expert witness. Whether the expert's role is viewed as
one of authenticating and interpreting the treatise or as one of
proffering the principal evidence by testimony is a distinction lacking
functional significance.42
Factors determining extent of use of treatises
Disparities in the extent of reliance on witnesses and textual
presentations reflect the influence of a number of elements other than
the implicit features of the two kinds of evidence. The lawyer's
method of presentation can expand the efficacy of either. The ques-
tionnaire responses indicated that some consideration is given to the
contextual dimensions43 of the case itself. While live testimony is
A' Counsel may avoid the necessity of procuring his own expert to testify by having
the opposing party's medical expert admit on cross-examination to the quality and
repute of a text to be offered as direct evidence. While such a hostile witness may be
uncooperative in placing any stamp of authority on the text, he will also be hesitant
to appear unread or ill-equipped by denying familiarity with a standard medical
work. Stipulation of the parties, judicial notice, and testimony of a medical librarian
are additional, feasible routes to authentication not requiring the in-court testimony
of a physician.
42 From the comments made on several of the questions it is clear, however, that
most Alabama attorneys using text evidence regard it as supplementary material which
does assume considerable importance when primary, testimonial evidence is unavailable.
" The questionee was asked to assess the impact of the following circumstances on
his use of a live witness and/or a medical treatise: the difficulty of the medical
issue; the identity of the finder of fact, i.e., judge or jury; the sex and/or race of his
client (or of the opposing client); the type of court, i.e., state or federal; the nature
of the case, i.e., criminal or civil, medical malpractice, etc.; and the side of the case
he represented, Le., plaintiff or defendant, prosecution or defense.
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clearly preferred by counsel in a jury trial, some practitioners are
more inclined to rely on treatise evidence where a judge is fact-finder.
The difficulty of the medical issue involved was identified as apposite,
but it was not clear which type of evidence a complex medical issue
would encourage.
Most prominent of these contextual dimensions is the nature of
the case, resort to text evidence being more recurrent in medical mal-
practice suits than in other kinds of actions. The explanation of this
preference is perhaps obvious, in view of the well-known reluctance of
doctors to testify against another member of their profession who is
charged with malpractice. Thus, in small rural areas the needed
expert testimony may almost be nonexistent. A medical treatise
may then be the only feasible source of evidence available to the
plaintiff. With it he can satisfy the Alabama scintilla of evidence
rule44 and reach the jury with the negligence issue, thereby avoiding
an affirmative charge for the other party. Even beyond this, how-
ever, the possession and use of a respected medical treatise assures a
greater degree of truthfulness and objectivity on the part of the
defendant doctor or another physician testifying in his behalf, accord-
ing to a number of the attorneys questioned. This protection prob-
ably derives more immediately from use of the treatise in cross-
examination, but even as independent evidence the treatise is a
valuable tool for meeting the recognized advantage of defendants in
this type of case. The greater importance of learned treatises to the
trial of medical malpractice suits was demonstrated by the responses
to the question querying the impact of abolition of the rule.
Approximately two-thirds of the lawyers questioned agreed that
abolition would considerably alter day-to-day practice in trying
medical malpractice cases, whereas most felt that criminal practice
would be affected only to a small degree. Similarly, a heavy majority
expressed the latter opinion as to personal injury cases in general.45
"See, e.g., Ball v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 270 Ala. 265, 118 So. 2d 724
(1960).
" The question and numerical distribution of responses are as follows: To abolish
the learned treatise rule in Alabama would alter the day-to-day practice in Alabama:
drastically considerably to a small degree not at all
criminal cases 5 4 81 12
personal injury cases 13 16 37 8
medical malpractice cases 25 17 18 7
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As a further factor, any expense and/or inconvenience involved in
the production and use of evidence will enter into the practitioner's
planning of his case. One argument advanced to support the learned
treatises exception is that savings accrue to a party when the avail-
ability of inexpensive treatise evidence makes unnecessary the costly
procurement of one or more expert medical witnesses. Actually the
burden on the lawyer's time and the litigant's pocketbook should be
roughly the same for both kinds of evidence, since authentication of
treatise material is typically accomplished by testimony of a phy-
sician.48 This practice and the observed reluctance of counsel to rely
on text evidence without the support of live expert testimony compel
the conclusion that the cost and convenience factors are not weighted
in favor of the treatise as is often supposed. In fact, in addressing
themselves to this issue, almost as many Alabama attorneys responded
affirmatively as negatively to the statement that it was generally
more troublesome and/or expensive to produce a witness to authenti-
cate a medical treatise than to procure an expert witness to prove the
same facts by oral testimony.47 The reasons for this surprising
response are not clear. Despite this reported experience, however,
it is perhaps worth noting that there remains a potential economy,
to the extent that counsel can or will avail himself of a mode of
authentication not requiring the courtroom presence of a phy-
sician. 48
The extent of reliance on treatise evidence might further be in-
fluenced by the difficulty accompanying introduction of such mate-
rial. The authentication hurdle is most often surpassed by testimony
of the party's physician on direct examination. A second, frequently
employed method is to have the opponent's physician admit to the
authority of the work on cross-examination. Since use of a treatise
for impeachment purposes is customarily prefaced by such an ad-
mission, it is difficult to assess the extent to which authentication by
cross-examination relates to the employment of such material as
"6 But see note 41 supra.
17 Twenty lawyers answered that it was more troublesome and/or expensive to
use an authenticating witness, and twenty-four indicated that less trouble and/or
expense was involved in this use. Although the question, as posed, did not include a
"no difference" alternative answer, twelve lawyers wrote in comments to that effect,
noting that the same medical witness is almost always used by them for both purposes.
11 See note 41 supra.
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independent evidence. Pre-trial stipulation of the parties as to the
standing of a text within the medical profession would obviate the
need for in-court authentication, but this practice is apparently not
widespread in Alabama. Similarly, the testimony of an expert wit-
ness would not be needed and a trial expense averted if judicial
notice were liberally taken of the authenticity of standard works.49
Except in isolated instances,50 Alabama judges have not permitted
this "short-cut."
Nevertheless, the cumulative experience of the attorneys respond-
ing to the questionnaire indicates that only a very small percentage
of the proffers of text evidence have met with rejection by the trial
courts.51 The principal ground for exclusion has been the technical
defect of insufficient authentication. The more general evidentiary
objections of hearsay and irrelevancy have been urged with success
only infrequently. That the former objection is sustained at all is
curious in light of the fact that the Williamson rule operates precisely
as an exception to the hearsay doctrine; however, the explanation
"'As an example of other modes of authentication, judicial notice of the authority
of a proffered text might be taken on an extension of the "facts of general notoriety"
theory, i.e., the work is widely or commonly recognized as standard by those in the
medical profession. Professor McCormick suggests that the law has not yet extended
this "common knowledge concept" to the body of knowledge common only to those in a
given field, although a few courts have moved in this direction. C. McCoRmicK, Evi-
DENCE § 324 & nn.7-8 (1954). Facts capable of ready and accurate verification or
demonstration-including established propositions in the professional and scientific dis-
ciplines, C. MCCORMICK, supra at § 325. See generally Comment, 36 MICH. L. REv. 610
(1938)-are generally accorded judicial notice, and a text's authoritativeness might be
thought to fall within this classification. Or, the rule by which the genuineness of
certain official documents, or the authenticity and reliability of sources containing
economic and social data relied upon by a legislature in enacting controversial legislation,
are given judicial notice might be applied analogously to establish the authority of
medical texts introduced. In so doing the judge would not be guilty of usurping the
jury prerogative of deciding questions of fact since the issue of "authority" is one of
admissibility of evidence over which the judge has traditional responsibility. The
provision in the Uniform Rules of Evidence making learned treatises admissible permit
the judge to take "judicial notice . . . that the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a
reliable authority in the subject." UNIFORM RuLE OF EVENCE 63 (31). Opposed to this
conferral of judicial notice would be the persuasive argument that a judge is not
knowledgeable as to the quality of medical and scientific literature, and his only real
source of such knowledge is expert opinion which should, for the protection of the
other party in the case, be given in court.
30 Only Gray's Anatomy and the National Electric Safety Code were specifically listed
as medical-scientific materials which have, on occasion, been admitted without formal
authentication. Several attorneys declared that treatises are not properly subject to
judicial notice under Alabama rules of practice.
51 By rough estimate based on the data supplied by the responding attorneys, less
than one percent of medical texts submitted as evidence have been excluded.
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probably lies in unfamiliarity with the rule by the judiciary and the
bar alike in some areas. The great bulk of attorneys questioned sig-
nified that admissibility does not depend on whether the plaintiff or
the defendant seeks it, in either criminal or civil (including medical
malpractice) cases.52
The type of treatise material and the subject matter may affect
the emphasis which the trial practitioner places on this genus of
evidence. As to the latter factor, two-thirds of the attorneys ques-
tioned reported that texts of psychiatry are not given weight equal to
that accorded other medical texts by juries. Pamphlets, periodicals,
and other like written materials are presumably admissible under the
Williamson rule if the authentication and relevancy requirements can
be met.5 3 Yet while a medical journal may be more current than a
book and, therefore, possess special persuasive power as evidence, it
may also embody findings or theories which are tentative and subject
to modification with further research and investigation, an observa-
tion which the opposing counsel may be expected to make in his
argument to the jury. Furthermore, jurors might speculate that
resort to an "obscure" journal article was necessitated by the absence
in more comprehensive treatises of support for counsel's urgings.
In the same vein, a pamphlet or report may be less impressive to a
jury than a text which is represented as being widely used and re-
spected by doctors and medical schools. These observations suggest
that practical limitations on the utility of certain kinds of treatise
5 The question was asked whether, from the attorney's observations, medical treatises
were more likely to be admitted when offered by one side or the other in any of the
specified kinds of cases. The responses are tabulated below:
plaintiff or no
prosecution defendant difference
criminal 2 14 81
cases
medical malpractice 5 8 44
cases
other civil cases 7 4 57
53 Among those periodicals and journals mentioned as having been successfully em-
ployed under the Williamson rule are: American Medical Association Journal, Clinics
of North America, Journal of Industrial Medicine, New England Journal of Medicine,
Mayo Clinics. But see note 16 supra. Under "other materials" were listed the National
Electrical Safety Code, a newspaper article on medicine, and a variety of other sources
not strictly within the learned treatises exception to the hearsay rule (encyclopedias,
catalogues, building codes, hospital regulations, etc.).
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materials exist for a lawyer sensitive to the probable reception of his
evidence by the jury.
Procedure for trial use of treatises
The manner of use of medical treatise evidence seems to depend
largely on the preferences of the introducing lawyer, qualified in
some instances by the trial judge's inherent discretionary power
over details of procedure. 54 Advance notice to opposing counsel
of the intended introduction of specified books has not been required
by trial judges in Alabama. Neither is such notice voluntarily
given by the attorneys.5   An argument may be made that such
advance notice would facilitate the rational operation of the rule by
enabling opposing counsel to evaluate more fully the authority and
accuracy of the prospective text evidence. Such an occasion for a
more extended examination by the attorney or his medical advisor
would discourage the offering of outdated materials or of passages
out of context, and thus improve the quality of treatise evidence in
general. However, almost no dissatisfaction was expressed by the
questioned attorneys concerning the absence of required notice.
TPYentation of the medical treatise to the jury may be accom-
plished by several means. The most popular approach is for the law-
yer himself to read the relevant passages. This may be done by a
direct recitation of the passage to the jury after the text is admitted,
a recitation of the passage to the opponent's medical expert in the
presence of the jury to determine if the text and the expert agree,56
and/or a reading (perhaps a second time) of the passage in the
39 The matter of numerical limitations on the use of treatises at trial is discussed
in text following note 79 infra.
11 Both the Massachusetts and the Nevada statutes authorizing the evidentiary use
of learned treatises in malpractice actions contain mandatory provisions for detailed
notice to the other party in advance of trial. See notes 26-27 supra. In New Jersey,
an expert is statutorily required to give advance notice of his contemplated reading
of a text excerpt during direct testimony. See note 24 supra.
516 See, e.g., Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915).
A sizable minority of states sanction such a reading as a means of testing the expert's
qualifications and/or knowledge on a disputed issue, though the prevailing view seems
to be otherwise. 6 WIGMORE § 1700 nn. 2-3, and cases cited therein; Comment, 2
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 252, 254 (1955). Where the expert has specifically mentioned and re-
lied on a medical treatise, it may be read to impeach him on the theory of discrediting
a witness by demonstration of misstatement on a material point. This use is broadly
recognized. WIGMORE, supra at note 4; 29 U. CIN. L. Rv. 255, 257-58 (1960). See notes
35-36 supra and accompanying text.
lawyer's closing argument to the jury.57 An alternative method
frequently followed is to have the physician read the excerpt orally
on direct or cross-examination before he is asked to comment on it.s
Only rarely are the jurors requested to read the passages themselves.
After the pertinent portion of the treatise is read to or for the
benefit of the jury, interpretive comments will be made. As a gen-
eral rule, the function of elucidation is performed by the authenti-
cating physician. In fact, many of the lawyers questioned stated
that in their experience only the expert was allowed to explain and
expand on the text passage. Even where such a procedure does
exist, however, a skilled advocate can and, on the basis of comments
in the questionnaires, does frequently summarize the import of his
treatise evidence, either implicitly or expressly, in his final argument
to the jury.
Responses were divided over whether treatises introduced by the
parties usually go with the jury to the jury room during deliberation,
the majority replying negatively. 59 As a matter of speculation,
xeroxed or photographed copies made by the offering lawyer would
appear to stand a better chance of being allowed in the jury room
than an entire textbook, only a small excerpt of which was admitted
in evidence. Most of those responding agreed that juries are usually
instructed by the court to confine their consideration of any text
material to those passages actually read or pointed out to them in
court. Such an instruction would have importance only when the
57 A few jurisdictions apparently permit counsel to read from a medical book in
argument to the jury while refusing to admit the same excerpts as direct evidence.
See, e.g., State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330, 337-38 (1878): "[I]n this jurisdiction for a long
series of years counsel have been permitted to read to the jury as part of their argument
... extracts from such treatises as by the testimony of experts have been accepted by the
profession as authority upon that subject .... " Cf. State v. Soper, 148 Mo. 217, 49 S.W.
1007 (1899) (denial of counsel's request to read medical texts to jury not error since
matter is one of court's discretion). This result is achieved in a few states by accepting
a tenuous differentiation between the permissible use of a text passage in argument for
purposes of illustration and the impermissible use thereof as evidence. See Cory v.
Silcox, 6 Ind. 39 (1854); 8 B. JONEs, EVDENcE §623 (5th ed. 1958); 6 W0MORE § 1700.
However, since this rule allows placing before the jury by indirection material which is
otherwise inadmissable, most courts forbid such a reading. 8 B. JoNEs, supra.
58 See note 24 supra and accompanying text; cf. Eagleston v. Rowley, 172 F.2d 202
(9th Cir. 1949) (non-jury, civil suit); State v. Nicolosi, 228 La. 65, 81 So. 2d 771 (1955).
It has been held permissible for an expert witness to read from a scientific pamphlet or
treatise to corroborate his testimony. E.g., Coastal Coaches, Inc. v. Ball, 234 S.W.2d
474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). But see 3 B. JONEs, supra note 57, at § 622.
39 Numerically, thirty-three questionees answered "yes" to this question, forty-two
answered "no."
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entire book was taken to the jury room. 60 The practice of allowing
text evidence to accompany the jurors during deliberation generally
increases the impact of this evidence as compared to that of expert
testimony given earlier in the trial. A juror would tend to refer to
the treatise or his copy of the excerpt to resolve any lingering doubts
caused by a conflict between it and the opposing testimony, the de-
tails of which he may have forgotten. Thus, the treatise would have
the last chance at persuading the jury to adopt "its" view.
JUSTIFICATION FOR LEARNED TREATISES EXCEPTION
The main criteria against which any proposed exception to the
hearsay rule is measured are the necessity of receiving the evidence
and the probability of its trustworthiness. 61 In the area of medical
and other learned treatises, theory and practice combine to build a
strong case for sustaining an exception to the hearsay rule. The
probability of truthworthiness of learned treatises has been recognized
to be high. Since learned authors are writing for their profession,
their published work will be subject to scrutiny and criticism of
others in the profession. This factor not only promotes sound
scholarship but also makes it likely that shortcomings in the published
work will be exposed. Adding to this the authoritativeness of the
work as a requirement for admission and the disinterestedness of the
outcome of the trial, the balance is struck definitively in the direction
of satisfactory reliability.
The criterion of necessity is intended to insure consideration of
alternative ways for getting a particular piece of evidence admitted.
One alternative to the use of text evidence is procurement of the
author to testify in person. However, this alternative poses a po-
tentially inordinate burden of cost on the litigant. In addition, if
the author resides outside the jurisdiction, he may be beyond the
00 The modem practice posits in the trial judge discretion as to whether an exhibit
or document admitted into evidence shall accompany the jury to the jury room. C. Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE § 184 (1954).
61 J. TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 229-30 (1952); 5 WIGMORE § 1420.
Dean Wigmore's application of these criteria to the learned treatises area is contained
in 6 WV5MORE §§ 1691-92. These criteria are merely inversions of the primary objections
to juridical acceptance of hearsay declarations; i.e., as out-of-court matter typically
reported second-hand, and resting for its probative value on the credibility of one not
under oath or subject to cross-examination, it is fraught with unreliability; and since
the declarant may ordinarily be brought into court to testify directly as to the facts
asserted, admission of the hearsay is not necessary. When these objections are removed,
exclusion is no longer justifiable.
reach of legal process. Therefore, there may be no practicable way
of presenting his opinion as direct evidence, other than to admit the
book itself. Another avenue, that of questioning a medical expert
on the content of a learned treatise, is allowable only to verify the
competence of the expert and, under the majority rule, may not be
used as a means to inject the treatise author's findings and con-
clusions.
Also tending to support the "necessity" of the learned treatise
exception to the hearsay rule is the feeling of many Alabama attorneys
that the operation of the rule in their state is an invaluable, if not an
essential, aid in medical malpractice cases, cases in which a doctor-
owned insurance company is defendant, and cases involving a reluc-
tant medical witness.6 2 Even in normal civil suits, it is often difficult
62 It is becoming increasingly evident that changes in the law are necessary to cope
with the special problems of the malpractice action. See Note, 77 HAxv. L. REv. 333
(1963). Speaking of the reasons behind the original Massachusetts statute providing for
direct admission of textual evidence in malpractice actions, one commentator noted:
"It is well known that doctors are usually unwilling to take the witness stand in a mal-
practice case to give expert evidence as to the care and skill used by fellow-physicians
in similar cases. As a result of this refusal by the medical profession to inform the
court as to matters within their specialty when the case is one of alleged malpractice,
many a victim of a physician's negligence has gone uncompensated, and other physi-
cians are thereby also permitted to depart from the recognized standards of skill and
care without the risk of accounting to the victim." 10 NACCA L.J. 256, 257 (1952).
Even if medical texts were held to be admissible as direct substantive evidence, courts
would still be faced with the problem of passing on their relevance as evidence of the
standard of care required of the doctor in a particular community. Under the
present majority rule, the written opinions of experts may not be presented as evidence
of the best or safest techniques: "It is obvious that medical books cannot fix the
standard of practice for a particular community-the standard of practice for a par-
ticular community may be higher or lower or differ otherwise from the textwriter's
recommended practices." Scarano v. Schnoor, 158 Cal. App. 2d 612, 620, 323 P.2d 178,
183 (1958). Even under the special Massachusetts statute allowing the introduction of
books in malpractice cases, MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 79C (Supp. 1966), the Massachu-
setts court in Ramsland v. Shaw, 341 Mass. 56, 166 N.E.2d 894 (1960), was of the
opinion that the geographical referent of books used to establish the standard of care
required of a doctor must be in terms of the particular locality since the standard is
local: "This treatise was published in England and was written by an English author....
[Tjhe judge in exercising his discretion was influenced by the fact that there might
be differences between the anesthesia procedures and techniques obtaining in England
and those obtaining here. The defendants' conduct, of course, must be tested by the
standards of care and skill prevailing in the community where they practised." Id. at
64-65, 166 N.E.2d at 901. See also Reddington v. Clayman, 334 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d
920 (1956), for an example of the difficulties besetting the attorney in his attempt to
establish the fact that the author is expert in his profession in a malpractice suit.
Under the Nevada statute, NEv. REv. STAT. § 51.040 (1965), however, which is simi-
lar to the Massachusetts statute, the supreme court of that state has recently indi-
cated that, upon establishment of the expertise of the author, his writings will be
admissible in malpractice cases if he was familiar with standards of practice throughout
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in the smaller communities to get a live witness to testify because of
expense, travel, and inconvenience. Thus, the need for and ad-
vantages of educating the jury on the question at hand may render
resort to publications imperative.
THE OBJECTIONS TO A LEARNED TREATISES EXCEPTION
An analysis of the aggregate experience of Alabama trial lawyers
under the Williamson rule aids in evaluating the substance of re-
curring objections to its adoption elsewhere. The major reason
articulated for disallowing the use of learned treatises as direct evi-
dence is that it violates the rule against hearsay evidence.63 This is
doubtless true, for the author of the submitted statements is not
present for cross-examination and he did not originally make the
statements under oath. The efficacy of the oath in securing reliable
testimony is open to question.64 Also, the reliability of the treatise
is assured by the author's desire to avoid criticism of it by his peers.6 5
In addition to the hearsay rationale, courts have ascribed several other
reasons for excluding learned treatises as independent evidence:
medicine is not an exact, but a changing science; 66 the author's thesis
may not be fairly and accurately represented;6 7 the opinions of
authors on the same subject may differ radically;6 8 and juries are un-
able to understand the technical language of scientific treatises. 69
The viability of each of these objections and of the demand for
cross-examination will be evaluated in light of the Alabama experi-
ence.
The theory supporting cross-examination of experts is that it
helps to establish the accuracy of their assertions and tests their quali-
the United States, even though he was not familiar with the standard in the locality.
See Foreman v. Ver Brugghen, 81 Nev. 86, 398 P.2d 993 (1965) (dictum).
68 E.g., Baily v. Kreutzmann, 141 Cal. 519, 75 P. 104 (1904); Hallworth v. Republic
Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 91 N.E.2d 690 (1950).
01 Writing of the inefficacy of the oath in judicial proceedings, Bentham has com-
mented: "But, whether principle or experience be regarded, it will be found, in the
hands of justice an altogether useless instrument; in the hands of injustice, a deplorably
serviceable one." I J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 366 (1827).
'5 See text following note 61 supra.
66 Cf. Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 145 A.2d 362 (1958).
OT See Boyle v. State, 57 Wis. 472, 15 N.W. 827 (1883).
06 Bixby v. Omaha & C.B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898).
69 Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1. 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
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fications.70 However, when the accuracy and competency of the
expert is unquestioned by the particular profession,71 the need for
cross-examination is questionable. Thus, the need to "cross-examine"
the content of a widely-respected medical treatise would appear to
be minimal. Indted, instead of "cross-examining" the treatise, the
opponent of the party introducing the treatise could refute the
treatise's evidence more effectively by presenting his own authority,
in the form of another accepted treatise or a qualified live expert
witness. However, the logic of these conclusions is apparently not
recognized by supporters of the majority rule, who argue that the
inability to "cross-examine" treatises should preclude their use as
direct evidence.
Furthermore, the necessity of cross-examination to test whether a
witness meets the minimum qualifications of an expert 2 is lessened
by the fact that the author of a treatise generally will be more quali-
fied than the average acceptable witness. No live expert witness is
ever totally disinterested, if only because of the fee he receives.7
In addition, some expert witnesses are simply biased. 4 Thirdly, the
"conspiracy of silence" among doctors forecloses much expert testi-
mony.75 To the extent these conditions exist, the quality of the
evidence elicited from expert witnesses is diluted. The scholarly
publication, on the other hand, is certainly disinterested in the out-
come of any particular trial. Furthermore, since scholarly publica-
tions are presumably written for the purpose of disseminating knowl-
edge, it is reasonable to assume that the author, if he is recognized
in his field, has accurately presented the matters with which he
deals.
TO Moore v. State, 184 Ark. 682, 43 S.W.2d 228 (1931); Van Stike v. Potter, 53 Neb.
28, 73 N.W. 295 (1897).
7 1 The legal requirement of authentication, which must be met in Alabama before
admission of a learned treatise as evidence is allowed, would insure that the author is
considered an authority in his profession. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying
text; text following note 48 supra.
72 The requirement that the author of the text be an authority in the field is part
of the minority rule. See City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 607, 188 So. 264, 266
(1939).
78 Bomar, The Compensation of Expert Witnesses, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 510, 522
(1935).
7 People v. Vanderhoof, 71 Mich. 158, 168, 39 N.W. 28, 32 (1888); see Elliott &
Spillman, Medical Testimony in Personal Injury Cases, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 466
(1935).
'15 Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F.2d 660, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., dissenting);
Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 483, 234 P.2d 34, 45 (1951).
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Medicine is a changing science
A second objection to the rule permitting use of medical treatises
is the observation that medicine is a highly inexact and changing
science, and that medical books consequently tend to be outdated and
unreliable.76 To this criticism the overwhelming majority of those
questioned were unsympathetic. Initially, Alabama practitioners
urged that such an objection goes to the weight of the evidence, not
to the question of admissibility. To the substance of the objection,
they argued that in order for the treatise to be admitted under Ala-
bama law, it must be shown by competent evidence to be a standard
authoritative text.77  If the book were proved to be outdated, it
would presumably not be considered standard and authoritative.
Secondly, it was felt that a lawyer would be foolish to attempt to use
an outdated publication because, even were it to be admitted, its
probative weight could be easily discounted by proof of a later
publication. Finally, many felt that, even though only a relatively
small volume of the material in standard medical texts is outdated, it
is precisely because medicine is a changing science that books should
be admitted. The thrust of this argument is that the majority of
doctors, who become the expert witnesses at trial, are reluctant to
abandon theories learned in medical school, that they often fail
to keep up with medical advances, and that many know very little
about laboratory techniques, the meaning of laboratory data, and
record-keeping procedures. This general attitude reflects the feeling
that if medical evidence is to be admitted at all, it should not be
confined to expert witness testimony, but should comprise all relevant
and authoritative expert opinion, with the determination of the
weight to be afforded the evidence left to the triers of fact.
Inaccurate or misleading presentation
The present majority rule is frequently justified on the ground
that it precludes the problem of misleading or inaccurate representa-
tion of the author's views through presentation of passages isolated
from their context. Insofar as this objection is intended to indicate
a condition unique to evidence in published form, it is specious.
Even live expert testimony is subject to an unfair presentation by
' Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 145 A.2d 362 (1958).
' E.g., Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558, 567 (1857).
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virtue of what is or is not disclosed,78 yet the adversary system is
deemed a sufficient safeguard for eliciting truth and impeaching the
credibility of experts who do not give accurate testimony. Similarly,
in the case of published writings offered in evidence, the opposing
counsel may be relied upon to detect the quality of evidence and, if
it is false or misleading, to expose these defects. 79
"Battle of the books"
Another objection to a learned treatises exception to the hearsay
rule is that, in cases involving debated medical issues, the opinions of
authors may differ radically concerning a particular issue.80 Thus,
each side may attempt to overwhelm the other with the sheer num-
ber of authorities supporting its claim. This possibility could occur
in Alabama, for the vast majority of the questioned attorneys reported
that trial judges do not limit the number of medical treatises which
can be introduced by each side.81 Presumably the Alabama courts
have not invoked their discretion to impose any limits because no
deluge of treatises has occurred. The results of the questionnaire con-
firm this conclusion. The average number of medical treatises
introduced in a trial in which such material is placed in evidence
was reported to be between two and three for both sides, and between
one and two for one side. The maximum number of books reported
to have been introduced in evidence in any one trial by both sides
was thirty, eighteen being the second largest figure. The maximum
number introduced in one trial by a single side was twenty-eight,
the next greatest number being fifteen. In addition, because juries
accord more weight to the testimony of live expert witnesses than to
78 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 302 (1963).
70 The misleading presentation objection also comprehends the situation in which
an author has changed his view since the last publication date. In such a case ad-
mission of the book in evidence would clearly be undesirable. Again, however, the
nature of the adversary system would seem to provide a sufficient safeguard for dis-
closure of that fact. The only problem here is the policy choice of whether such a
burden, if it is a burden, should be imposed on opposing counsel.
80 Bixby v. Omaha & C.B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898). As
well as worrying about the disagreement among authorities, some courts have suggested
that potentially time-consuming collateral proceedings may be necessary to authenticate
the books offered. Hallworth v. Republic Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 355, 91 N.E.2d
690, 693 (1950).
81 A few attorneys answered that they had seen a numerical limitation imposed by
the court on the number of books which could be introduced. In such cases most said
the number was variable from case to case. Only three attorneys said the numerical
limitation was approximately the same from case to case, that being one or two books.
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medical texts, the Alabama attorneys reported that (1) when one
side uses a live expert witness, the other side is virtually never content
to respond with a treatise alone; and (2) when one side offers in
evidence a medical text, the other side does not feel compelled to
respond with one or more treatises in return.
The jury cannot understand
Finally, the proponents of the present rule point out that the
language of scientific treatises is unavoidably beyond the understand-
ing of the layman.82 Hence, they conclude, the publication will only
confuse the jury and, thus, be useless as direct evidence. This theory,
however, is not entirely corroborated by practice. According to the
majority of those questioned, if the subject matter of the treatise is
sufficiently technical to be beyond the comprehension of laymen,
then some kind of interpretation will be provided to the jury, in
addition to the passage being read to them."3 This interpretation is
most often provided by an expert witness on direct or cross-examina-
tion, or by the lawyer in his argument.8 4 Furthermore, a substantial
number of attorneys felt that in many cases where such evidence was
involved the jury could easily understand the medical excerpt without
any interpretation. If the meaning of the passage could not be con-
veyed to the jury with a simple explanatory statement, some lawyers
would simply not use the book. Thus, the sentiment again was that
such criticism does not go to the admissibility of the learned treatise,
but only to its weight. In addition, several of the trial attorneys indi-
ated that this issue involved more basic considerations, namely, that
the real question is whether juries are qualified to judge expert testi-
mony from any source, live or published. However, so long as the
jury system is employed, the assumption must be that they are so
qualified, and, therefore, any rule which restricts the jury from
being exposed to all relevant expert testimony is undesirable.
CONCLUSION
The questions posed at the outset concerned the workability of
the Alabama learned treatises exception and its qualitative impact
upon the trial process in that state. Several evaluative conclusions
82 Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 7, 219 S.W.2d 779, 783 (1949).
11 The Williamson court indicated that such interpretive comment was required in
an instance such as this. 29 Ala. at 567.81 See text following note 58 supra.
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suggest themselves upon an analysis of the questionnaire results.
First, it is apparent that the Williamson rule is not widely known or
appreciated by the trial bar in that state.85 This unfamiliarity may
be inferred from the low number of returned questionnaires," the
assumption being that a completed questionnaire is, to a measurable
degree, a function of the respondent's experience with the rule.
Further, even of those who did respond, a sizable number commented
that the rule is rarely invoked or that they were not aware that such
a rule existed. Also disclosed was the misconception held by a sig-
nificant number of the responding attorneys that learned treatises
are only competent to impeach or test a witness on cross-examination.
The Williamson rule, of course, relates only to the introduction of
learned treatises as direct, independent evidence.
Secondly, the segment of trial attorneys sampled by the ques-
tionnaire overwhelmingly approved of the learned treatise excep-
tion.s 7 This approval seemingly reflects the general opinion of
Alabama attorneys knowledgeable as to its operation, again on the
assumption that the questionnaires remitted came primarily from
attorneys who are most familiar with or who have marked feelings
concerning the exception. Nonetheless, it is apparent that trials in
Alabama have by no means been drastically changed by the avail-
ability of medical books as direct evidence. Instead, these materials
have played a secondary, though valued, role. A medical text is
most often used as an adjunct to live expert testimony, serving to
augment the probative force of such evidence or to cast doubt upon
the medical conclusions urged by the other side. In instances in
which a party cannot secure the services of a physician as a witness,
as is not uncommon for plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions,
the fact that medical books may be employed at least assures that
85 This observation is not intended as a criticism of the Alabama bar. The facts
that the Williamson doctrine is quite old and that it has not been the topic of recent
discussion or publicity within the state's legal community may explain its relative
obscurity. Since, in connection with this project, almost all attorneys in the state were
sent a letter explaining the rule and its operation, an expanded usage might be antici-
pated in the future.
B8 The ratio of questionnaires sent to those received was approximately 6 percent.
See note 7 supr. This figure is misleading, though, since no distinction was made
between "trial" and "non-trial" lawyers in the circularization, no list of the former
alone being available, and only those with litigation experience were expected to reply.
87Only nine attorneys indicated that they personally disapproved of the exception,
and of this number three, while agreeing in principle, desired some minor modification
in the details of its operation.
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the suit will not be prematurely terminated. This result alone may
be regarded as sufficient to justify a learned treatise exception to the
hearsay rule.
The use of medical books at trial has also a more subtle influence
in "keeping the game honest."' s A witness may testify as an expert
in Alabama if he is shown in preliminary proof to have any knowledge
of his subject beyond that of the average layman.8 9 Serious de-
ficiencies in his comprehension can often be most graphically
demonstrated by use of a treatise. Several attorneys emphasized the
"deterrence" value of treatises; i.e., the mere sight of a stack of books
on medicine, they find, provides an incentive to the testifying doctor
to observe high standards of accuracy. Thus the mere threat of the
introduction of a book to expose dishonest or biased testimony is
often sufficient to make its actual use unnecessary. Even aside from
the problem of opinionated testimony, the Williamson rule may
elevate the qualitative level of medical evidence by facilitating the
presentation of new developments and advances, about which the
general community of practicing physicians may not be fully aware.
In all, there is detectable a generalized undercurrent of sentiment
among the responding attorneys that medical texts provide a very
beneficial countervailing force to expert testimony and serve to keep
the latter from completely dominating a case and its outcome.
Though the Williamson rule is serviceable in its present form,
several recommended improvements merit consideration. For reasons
already discussed, 0 provision should be made to require that advance
notice be given opposing counsel concerning the intended use of
specified treatises, with full disclosure of title, author, and date of
publication. This procedure would tend to discourage resort to
materials of questionable repute, too many of which have been ad-
mitted according to the complaints of several of those questioned.
The suggestion was made by one attorney that treatises be allowed
to be authenticated by the ex parte affidavit of a physician. The
obvious benefit of such a proposal lies in the opportunity it affords
8 An attitude of mistrust of the integrity of medical witnesses was surprisingly
prevalent throughout the questionnaires.
89 See, e.g., Thompson v. Magic City Trucking Serv., 275 Ala. 291, 295, 154 So. 2d
306, 310 (1963); cf. Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v. Heald, 168 Ala. 626, 643, 53 So.
162, 167 (1910).
90 See text accompanying notes 54-55 sup"a.
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to by-pass testimonial authentication by a physician in court, with its
attendant expense. However, this change does not seem desirable in
light of the charge that some Alabama courts have been too lax in
receiving published materials of questionable quality and of the need
to retain an occasion for challenging the authoritativeness of proffered
texts. An alternative suggestion is to expand the role of judicial
notice in this same authentication area. Thus, those medical texts
which are repeatedly brought into court and successfully authenti-
cated by various attorneys might be received without the necessity of
formal proof of their status as standard works. The drawback of this
procedure is that a book, once recognized as standard by judicial
notice, would tend by the natural inertia of the system to retain this
"privileged" status long past the day it represents current and accu-
rate medical opinion. The anticipated loss of flexibility in the trial
judge's control over admissibility argues against such a procedure.
The purpose which these last two proposals are designed to effect
could perhaps best be achieved by adoption of a pre-trial request-for-
admission procedure patterned after that of rule 36 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.91 This procedural mechanism would re-
duce the number of instances in which in-court authentication must
be executed, while at the same time it would preserve to opposing
counsel the opportunity to contest this issue, should he deem it
advisable to do so.92
Finally, although the majority of attorneys reported that the jury
was not allowed to take the learned treatises which had been admitted
as evidence with them to the jury room, many thought that the rule
would be improved if duplicated copies of the material which had
been introduced, rather than the entire treatise, were allowed to
91 FED. R. Civ. P. 36. This rule authorizes a party to serve a written request for the
admission of the genuineness of a relevant document or truth of a relevant fact upon
the other party. The matters submitted are regarded as admitted if the latter does
not respond with a specific denial, a statement explaining why he cannot admit or deny
them, or an objection based on privilege, irrelevance, or impropriety. If, after receiving
a denial of the matter concerning which an admission was sought, a party proves the
same, he may apply to the court for an order to the other party to pay the expenses
incurred in effecting such proof. FE. R. Civ. P. 87 (c). The authoritativeness of a
text is sufficiently akin to the "genuineness of a document" for rule 36 to serve
usefully as a vehicle for adoption and adaptation to achieve pre-trial authentication.
92 Even with the adoption of a viable method of pre-trial authentication of medical
books, most attorneys may be expected to continue to meet this condition of admis-
sibility by testimony of a doctor, whose appearance as a witness is generally deemed
necessary because of other considerations. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
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accompany the jury during deliberation. However, since oral testi-
mony, for which the admission of a learned treatise is only a substi-
tute, is not generally admitted to the jury room, 3 there is little
reason why such an exception should be made. Indeed, to permit
such evidence to be taken to the jury room would unreasonably ele-




Please answer all the questions; if you feel, however, that you cannot
fairly answer a question, mark it CANNOT ANSWER and state any
reasons for this response which you think might be helpful to us. In a
few instances, more than one of the suggested answers may be true, in
which case you may check as many as are appropriate. We solicit your
explanatory comments on any and all questions, particularly if the sped-
fied answers are not meaningful to you or an important alternative has
been omitted. Please feel free to use the back of these sheets if the space
provided is not adequate for your comments and answers. Since our major
concern is with the use of medical treatises under the learned treatise
rule, most of the questions have been phrased in terms dealing with the
medical treatise. If, however, there is a significant difference in treatment
observed by you as to other, non-medical learned treatises, please comment
to this effect under the appropriate questions. The completed question-
naire should be returned to: DUKE LAW JOURNAL, DUKE UNIVER-
SITY, DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA.
1. What is the size of your law firm?
................ .... partners and associates
2. How long have you been practicing law in Alabama?
.......... more than 30 years
............ .......... between 20 and 30 years
............. between 10 and 20 years
......................... less than 10 years
3. During that time in how many civil and criminal cases do you esti-
mate that you have participated as a trial advocate in both state and
federal courts?
.............................. more than 500 cases
........... ...... - between 100 and 500 cases
93 See, e.g., Zank v. West Penn. Power Co., 169 Pa. Super. 164, 82 A.2d 554 (1957);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 105, comment m (1942).
01 See Tescon, Should Impeaching Documents Go to the Jury?, 1959 TRIAL LAWYER'S
GumE 311, 317.
Vol. 1967: 1169] 1195
between 20 and 100 cases
fewer than 20 cases
4. Do you consider that you are now or have been at some time a
specialist in the trial of cases, either civil or criminal?
Yes
No
5. What percentage of your trial experience has been in
criminal cases
civil cases
6. In criminal trials, in what percentage of the cases have you repre-
sented
the prosecution .................. %
the defense .%?
7. In what percentage of civil cases have you represented
the plaintiff .%
the defense .%?
8. In how many medical malpractice cases have you represented
the plaintiff
the defense .............. ?
9. In what number of the civil cases which you have tried have medical
issues been involved?
most cases
a considerable number of cases
. ........ few or no cases
10. In what number of the criminal cases which you have tried have
medical issues been involved?
most cases
a considerable number of cases
few or no cases
11. On approximately how many occasions have you offered in evidence,
in order to prove their truth (not just for impeachment purposes),
assertions made in learned treatises or text books?
(number)
12. How many of the occasions specified in the preceding question have
involved medical books?
(number)
[If a numerical answer in the following three questions is not possible,
reasonably accurate percentage figures will be acceptable.]
13. On how many occasions have your proffered excerpts from medical
books been admitted into evidence by the trial judge?
(number)
14. When such offers of evidence have been rejected by the trial court, in
how many cases has it been on the grounds of
relevance (including remoteness, prejudice)
opinion rule
hearsay
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insufficient authentication
......other. grounds (please specify):
15. In how many cases have you successfully authenticated medical trea-
tises (shown them to be recognized authorities)
by testimony on direct examination of your medical
expert (including your client if he was a physician)
by testimony on cross-examination of your oppo-
nent's medical expert (including his client, if a phy-
sician)
by persuading the court to take judicial notice of
authenticity
by testimony of a medical librarian
....... ... by other means (please specify):
16. From your observations are medical treatises more likely to be ad-
mitted when offered
in medical malpractice in other civil
in criminal cases, by cases, by cases, by
the prosecution .. the plaintiff ... the plaintiff
............. the defense ... the defendant .. the defendant
.............. no difference ........ no difference ............ no difference
17. Among those learned treatises from which you have successfully in-
troduced statements of fact or opinion as evidence of the truth of such
statements are the following (please give names of books and authors):
...... .... ° ... ,......,°,...° *** ....... ..*.,... ... , . . . .. .. .. .. ,......... ....... . •...... .
18. List which of those treatises, if any, the trial judge has admitted with-
out requiring specific authentication (by taking judical notice that
they are standard or recognized authorities) (names of books and
authors):
°.,,.,,,,,,...... ... .° . , ,,. .,. ...... ....... ....... . ... . .. .... ....... ,............ ........
19. Among the types of learned treatise materials which'you have success-
fully offered into evidence are the following:
books
pamphlets, such as:
........... periodicals, such as:
............. ....... other materials, such as:
20. In your experience have trial judges required advance notice to the
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other side if medical treatises are to be offered in evidence?
-.- Yes





22. Do trial judges usually limit the number of medical treatises which can
be introduced by each side?
Yes __-_....No
23. Such a numerical limitation, where imposed, has been
variable from case to case
approximately the same from case to case.
24. If you marked the latter alternative in the preceding question, what
has the numerical limitation, i.e., the greatest number of medical
treatises which may be introduced into evidence, typically been?
treatises per side
25. What is the greatest number of medical treatises which you have seen
introduced in a single trial?
by both sides
by one side
26. What is the usual or average number of medical treatises introduced
in a trial in which some such material is placed in evidence?
by both sides
by one side
27. When one side offers into evidence a medical treatise, the other side-
responds with one or more treatises in return:
invariably (100%)
usually or very often (over 60%)
frequently (20-59%)
seldom (0-19%).
28. When one side uses a live expert witness, the other side is content to




29. Excerpts from medical treatises are usually presented to the jury by:
asking the jurors to read the passages themselves
having an expert witness read the passages to the
jury
having the lawyer read the passages to the jury
by other methods (please specify):
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30. Do the treatises introduced by the parties usually go with the jury to
the jury room during deliberation?
....... ...... .... Yes ................................. N o
31. Are juries usually instructed by the court to confine their considera-
tion of any treatises to those passages actually read or pointed out to
them in court?
Yes ........................... No
32. Are passages from medical and other technical books usually "inter-
preted" to the jury in addition to being read or pointed out to them?
............................ Yes ............... N o
33. This interpretation
................................. is required to be given by an expert witness
.......................... is usually provided by an expert witness, though
other methods of presentation are allowed
. ... may be provided by the lawyers
.................. . is sometimes provided in other ways (please specify):
,... .... ...................... ..... .... * .............................. .. .... .. ................ ..........................
34. From your observations, what effect do passages from learned treatises
introduced without interpretation have on a jury (e.g., apt to confuse
jury, usually understood by jury, etc.):
35. In your opinion, do juries give appreciable weight to learned treatises
evidence?
............................ Yes ................... N o
36. Do you think that texts of psychiatry are given the same weight by
juries as other medical treatises?
................................ Yes  ....  N o
37. What are your comments as to the validity of the criticism, frequently
raised against the admission of medical treatises, that medicine is an
inexact and rapidly changing science with resultant large numbers of
frequently contradictory and outdated books which a jury should not
be required to compare and evaluate as evidence?
38. Where a passage from a book conflicts with an opinion expressed
from the stand by an expert witness, the jury
............................ will more often than not accept the opinion of the
live witness
............................... will more often than not accept the statement from
the written authority
............................. will accept one or the other rather unpredictably.
39. Where the live witness and the conflicting book are of substantially
equal merit and authority, presentation by means of the live witness
is more effective
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40. Excluding any intrinsic superiority of a live witness over a written
authority (or vice-versa) as alternative means of introducing evidence,
what factors offset or accentuate the relative persuasiveness of the two
kinds of evidence (e.g., authority of witness or textbook author,
method of presenting treatise, etc.)?
41. Please comment on the impact, if any, of the following or any other
contextual circumstances on your decision as to whether to establish
a medical fact by use of a live expert witness or by use of a medical
treatise.
the difficulty of the medical issue:
the identity of the finder of fact, i.e., judge or jury:
the sex and/or race of your client (or of the opposing client):
the type of court, i.e., state or federal:
the nature of the case, i.e., criminal or civil, medical malpractice,
etc.:
the side of the case you represent, i.e., plaintiff or defendant, prose-
cution or defense:
other:
42. Have you found it generally more or. less troublesome and/or ex-
pensive to produce a witness to authenticate a medical treatise than
to procure an expert witness to prove by oral testimony what otherwise
might be proved by use of a treatise?
more troublesome and/or expensive
less troublesome and/or expensive
43. To abolish the learned treatise rule in Alabama. would alter the day-
to-day practice in
mediral malpractice
criminal cases personal injury cases cases
...... drastically ... drastically . ..... drastically
considerably - considerably ........ considerably
to a small degree . . to a small degree ......- to a small degree
not atall ..... not at all ........... not at all.
44. Do you personally approve of the Alabama learned treatise rule of
evidence?
. ........ Yes o....No
Please comment on the reasons for your answer.
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45. In what respect (s), if any, could this Alabama evidence rule be im-
proved:
46. Any observations you wish to add will be appreciated. We especially
solicit any further comments you may have on the practical applica-
tion of the learned treatise rule in Alabama or on any areas which
this questionnaire neglects.
